



COUNTERFACTUALS ARE PART OF THE MEANING OF CAUSATION BUT ARE NOT NECESSARILY PART OF HOW WE KNOW ABOUT IT

Relevant page:

Causal mapping is easier if we are realist about causation



We can **learn** about causal powers via constructing or observing pseudo-counterfactuals, but also via other routes.

Maybe counterfactual arguments logically follow from facts about causal powers. But the meaning of "X caused Y" can't be reduced to a counterfactual statement about co-occurrences.

"X caused Y" maybe implies something about a counterfactual: broadly speaking, that Y would not have happened if X had not happened and everything else had stayed exactly the same. (Philosophers love to argue over the details.)

But the meaning of "X caused Y" can't be *reduced* to a statistical, counterfactual statement about co-occurrences. It says that the co-occurrences are true but they happen *because X has the power to cause Y*, and X happened.